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Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud, through Foucault, to the Present:
Comments on Steven Lukes's In Defense of
"FalseConsciousness"
Bernard E. Harcourtt

Steven Lukes offers a precise, succinct, and forceful defense
of the idea of "false consciousness" in his provocative essay by
that name, In Defense of "FalseConsciousness" People can be
systematically mistaken about their own best interest, Lukes
contends-or, in his words, "they can have systematically distorted beliefs about the social order and their own place in it that
work systematically against their interests."2 It is not just that
sometimes people knowingly but regretfully make compromises,
nor simply that they face no alternative choices; people are at
times factually mistaken about what will promote their best interest. "There is truth to be attained," Lukes declares, a correct
view about where their interests lie, a view that is not itself "im-

t Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Professor and Chair, Department of Political
Science, The University of Chicago. I am deeply grateful to Steven Lukes, Robert Gooding-Williams, Andrew Dilts, Christopher Berk, Daniel Nichanian, Alexander de la Paz,
Daniel Wyche, and Tuomo Tiisala for comments on an earlier draft, and to Fabienne
Brion for many conversations and our work together on Michel Foucault's Louvain lectures.
1 The notion of false consciousness that Lukes develops in this essay is a particular
instance of the "third dimension" of power that he sets forth in his book, Power:A Radical
View (Palgrave Macmillan 2d ed 2005) ("Power" hereinafter) (see especially 144-151).
The structure of his presentation in this essay-namely, three answers-mirrors the
three dimensions of power that he lays out in Power.The first answer he offers (positive
and negative sanctions, offers and threats) corresponds to the first dimension of power,
which addresses the question of who prevails in decision-making situations involving
conflicts of interest (the Robert Dahl pluralism perspective). The second answer he offers
(lack of alternatives) corresponds to the second dimension of power, which addresses the
question of who controls the decision-making such that conflict is avoided (the Peter
Bachrach agenda-setting power). It is an aspect of the third dimension of power, namely
"the supreme exercise of power [which is] to get another or others to have the desires you
want them to have," Power at 27, that Lukes develops in this essay. It builds on the final
section of the third essay in Power ("'Real interests' and 'False Consciousness'"). Power at
149.
2 Steven Lukes, In Defense of "FalseConsciousness,'2011 U Chi Legal F 19, 27-28.

29

30

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

posed by power." 3 This argument, Lukes suggests, is not vulnerable to the retort that there are multiple, socially constructed
"regimes of truth," which are neither true nor false, because people are at times wrong about the factual premises of their beliefs.
On these occasions, they "hold factual beliefs that are susceptible
of truth and falsity (thus meeting the ['regimes of truth'] objection) [and slome of these key beliefs can be shown to be false." 4
Lukes's defense of false consciousness could not be articulated
with greater precision or, for that matter, erudition and elegance.
I.
My first concern when I read Steven Lukes's essay was that
the relationship between the theory of false consciousness and
the "regimes of truth" critique is more complex and is not properly captured by the notion of mutual exclusion.5 There are important family resemblances between the theory of ideology in
the Marxian tradition, especially as developed by the Frankfurt
School, and the critique of truth regimes rooted in the Nietzschian tradition of genealogy, especially as it evolved in the writings
of Michel Foucault.6 These strong family resemblances make it
counterproductive to argue that one theory is correct at the expense of the other-to argue, in effect, that one view would make
us reject the other. And by "counterproductive," I mean unproductive to the larger critical project that, I sense from the essay,
Steven Lukes and I share. The task, as I see it, is not to defend
one theory and discard the other, but to explore the overlap and
intricate relationship between the two in order to sharpen our
own contemporary critical interventions-in order to refine our
own critique.
In an interview in Telos in 1983, Foucault remarked that
"[n]othing is better at hiding the common nature of a problem
than two relatively close ways of approaching it."7 Foucault was
3 Id at 19, 28.
4 Id at 26-27.

5 In In Defense of "FalseConsciousness,"Lukes does view the "regimes of truth"
critique as mutually exclusive insofar as it would defeat, or lead us to reject, his false
consciousness argument. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, by contrast, Lukes
does not view the three dimensions of power as mutually exclusive. See Lukes, Power at
10 (cited in note 1) ("the other answers should not be seen as mutually exclusive").
6 Although Lukes does not explicitly attribute the "regimes of truth" critique to
Foucault, but rather to "postmodernist thinking," it is clear from the context, but even
more from Power,that Lukes has Foucault in mind. In Power, Lukes specifically associates Foucault with the idea of "regimes of truth." See Lukes, Power at 91 (cited in note 1).
SMichel Foucault, Dits et ecrits vol 4 #330 at 439 (vol 2 at 1258 in 2001 ed) (Galli-
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referring, naturally, to the Frankfurt School. In a very similar
vein, my concern is that Lukes's resistance to Foucault's workhis desire to reject, rather than to carefully embrace, or at least
to selectively draw from-has the effect of retarding, rather than
advancing, the critical project that we share. Let me begin here,
then, by reconnecting the two critiques. I am by no means, of
course, the first to venture down this path."
Il.
The question that Steven Lukes asks in his essay and to
which he offers the response of false consciousness-namely, the
question "why do people accept governments and follow leaders
and vote for politicians when doing so is against their interests?" 9-is a loaded question. It rests on certain premises that
challenge more traditional views about knowledge-premises
that not everyone shares. It rests on the radical questioning of
people's given desires and beliefs-a radical position, as Lukes
emphasized in the very title of his book, Power:A Radical View.10
The more conventional understanding is that behavior is a
reliable measure of a person's interests-one of the few, in fact.
Outward behavior is revealed preference: it is evidence of a rational choice that reflects what we truly desire far better than
what we tell ourselves or others. Putting aside occasional inadvertent mistakes and minor heuristic biases, the conventional
view takes at face value our actions as expressions of our real
interests. This conventional understanding rests on a traditional
mard 1994) ("Rien ne cache plus une communaute de probleme que deux fagons assez
voisines de I'aborder.").
8 Foucault himself explored this in a number of places in his work. See, for example,
Qu'est-ce que la critique?, 84:2 Bulletin de la Societe frangaise de philosophie 35, 47
(1990) (lecture delivered May 27, 1978); Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse: Who is a
Negator of HistoryZ in Foucault, Remarks on Marx: conversations with Duccio Trombadori (Semiotext(e) 1991); and Structuralisme et poststructuralisme,in Foucault, Dits et
ecrits, vol 4 #330 at 431-457 (vol 2 at 1250-76 in 2001 ed) (cited in note 7). For a collection of the Foucault/Habermas debate with excellent contributions from Axel Honneth,
Nancy Fraser, Thomas McCarthy and others, see Critique and Power: Recasting the
Foucault/HabermasDebate (MIT 1994) (Michael Kelly, ed). See also Thomas McCarthy,
The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School, 18 Political Theory
437, 437-469 (Sage Publications 1990); David Hoy, Power, Repression, Progress:Foucault, Lukes, and the rankfurt School, in David Hoy, Foucault:A CriticalReader 123148 (Basil Blackwell 1986) (explicitly bringing Lukes to bear on Foucault and the Frankfurt School). For another important discussion of Lukes's work, see John Gaventa, Power
and Powerlessness(U of Illinois Press 1980).
9 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 20 (cited in note 2).
10 Id at 22 (The first two dimensions of power "take[ ] people's desires and beliefs as
given"); Lukes, Powerat 28, 146 (cited in note 1).
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view of knowledge, a view that embraces a correspondence theory of truth and set standards of justification. It is often referred
to as the "justified true belief model of knowledge." 1 On this
view, an individual's stated interests are to be considered accurate, in the sense that they correspond with reality, when the
person has good reasons that can be clearly articulated and that
represent the bases for their beliefs and actions. Or, more formally, an individual can be said to know that X is in his interest just
in case (1) his belief that X is in his interest is true (where "true,"
again, is understood in terms of a correspondence theory of
truth) and (2) he has good reasons for his belief that X is in his
interest, which reasons he can clearly articulate, and which reasons are the basis for his actions.
As Raymond Geuss argued in his 1984 lectures at Princeton
University, and as Steven Lukes suggested in his original essay
on power in 1974, radical thinkers challenge this conventional
understanding and its underlying view of knowledge-not merely
criticizing the reasons that people give for their beliefs, nor simply attacking the beliefs citing better reasons, but instead challenging the very way in which beliefs come to be held by people. 12
They level, in Lukes's original words, "a thoroughgoingcritique
of the behavioralfocus" of the traditional view.13 Theirs is a radical view because it assumes "an external standpoint" and speaks
of "interests imputed to and unrecognized by the actors." 14 They
" I attribute the idea of approaching this with reference to the "justified true belief"
model of knowledge to Raymond Geuss and his lectures, at Princeton University, on
"Marx, Nietzsche, Freud" in the Spring of 1984. In those lectures, Geuss specifically introduced the idea of "radical thought" as a challenge to the "justified true belief" model.
Geuss's approach, naturally, built on his earlier book, The Idea of a Criticial Theory:
Habermasand the FrankfurtSchool (Cambridge 1981), which explicitly presented Marxian thought and the Frankfurt School as requiring "drastic revisions in traditional views
about the nature of knowledge." Id at 1. For a succinct definition of the "justified true
belief" model, see Matthias Steup, "Knowledge as Justified True Belief," in the entry on
Epistemology, Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2010), online at http/plato.stanford.edu/archiveq/spr2010/entries/epistemology/ (visited
Sept 6, 2011). For an approach that also explores radical thought in relation to the justified true belief model, see Brian Leiter, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: RecoveringMarx,
Nietzsche, and Freud,in Leiter, The Future for Philosophy 74-105 (Oxford 2006) (originally published 2004), online at http/papers.ssrn.conVsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=6
91002 (visited May 3, 2011). In an interesting way, as Steven Lukes points out to me,
Arthur Danto's discussion of "deep interpretation," specifically with reference to Marx
and Freud, bears a family resemblance here. See Arthur C. Danto, Deep Interpretation,
78 The JournalofPhilosophy 11, 691-706 (Nov 1981).
12 Personal lectures notes from Raymond Geuss's lectures on "Marx, Nietzsche,
Freud" at Princeton University in the Spring of 1984 (on file with author); Lukes, Power
at 28 (cited in note 1).
13 Lukes, Powerat 28 (cited in note 1).
14 Id at 146.
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challenge, in essence, the underlying standards of justification
and the very idea that people hold beliefs because of their articulated reasons. Rather than questioning a mistaken reason or individual reasoning here or there, radical thinkers attack the
larger relation between reasons and beliefs, as well as the view of
knowledge upon which it rests. And they offer theories about how
it is that people come to believe what they believe, despite their
own best interest.15
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the
emergence of several important strands of radical thought associated with the classic triumvirate-Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.16 Marx's writings would inspire an
approach that portrayed beliefs as ideologies necessary for the
reproduction of social systems of oppression-an approach that
influenced the idea of hegemony in Antonio Gramsci's Prison
7 of false consciousness in Georg Lukacs's History
Notebooks,1
8
of ideology critique for the Frankfurt
and Class Consciousness,1
School, and of ideological apparatuses in Louis Althusser's writ-

1 The distinctions are important and can be illustrated by means of Steven Lukes's
ingenious example of the Tea Party movement-which, for present purposes, will be
reduced to the belief in limited government. Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 26 (cited in
note 2). To make the more radical claim that members of the Tea Party are deluding
themselves, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the reasons they offer for their belief
in limited government are internally inconsistent: it is not enough to show, for instance,
that 62 percent of Tea Party members "still think that Social Security and Medicare are
worth the cost." Elbert Ventura, Teaism, New Republic, Online Review (Oct 7, 2010),
online at httpV/www.tnr.con/book/review/teaism-tea-party- (visited Sept 6, 2011); Kate
Zernike, BoilingMad: Inside Tea PartyAmerica 135-138, 203 (Times Books 2010). Nor is
it enough to show that the reasons they offer are pretextual: it is not enough to show, for
example, that "Tea Partiers have always or usually voted Republican 66 percent of the
time, compared to 28 percent for the general public." Ventura, Teaism. See also Zernike,
Boiling Mad at 150-153, 206. Instead, one would have to argue that they hold their beliefs in limited government as a result of forces they are largely unaware of-say, hypothetically, their psychological need to dominate poorer African-Americans in a hierarchized racial-caste society-and that those beliefs are positively detrimental to their
future well-being.
16 The pairing of this triumvirate is, naturally, classic. See Foucault, Nietzsche,
Freud,Marx, in Foucault, Dits et ecrits, vol 1 #46 at 564-579 (vol 1 at 592-607 in 2001
ed) (cited in note 7); Paul Ricoeur, Interpretationas Exercise of Suspicion, in Ricaeur,
Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation 32-33 (Yale 1970) (Denis Savage,
trans) (famously referring to Freud, Marx and Nietzsche as the "masters of suspicion");
Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory at 1 (Freud) and at 43-44 (Nietzsche) (cited in note
11); Geuss, Personal lecture notes (cited in note 12); Leiter, The Future for Philosophyat
74 (cited in note 11); Alistair Kee, The Masters of Suspicion: Feuerbach,Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud(Fortress forthcoming).
17 See generally Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (Columbia 1992) (Joseph Buttigieg, ed, Joseph Buttigieg and Antonio Callari, trans).
18 See generally Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist
Dialectics(MIT 1968) (Rodney Livingstone, trans).
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ings.19 Nietzsche's writings would give birth to an approach intimately relating beliefs to the exercise of human will and power, a
genealogical approach that would significantly influence later
theories of "savoir-pouvoir" 20 [knowledge-power] in IVIichel Foucault's writings and of the Anti-Oedipus of Gilles Deleuze and
F6lix Guattari. 21 Freud's writings would give rise to a psychoanalytic approach that would interpret beliefs through the lens of
the unconscious and of repression, an approach that would
strongly influence later thinkers such as, notably, Jacques Lacan,22 Julia Kristeva, 23 Renata Salecl, 24 and Slavoj Zizek. 25
These different strands of radical thought portrayed the reasons that people proffer for their beliefs as forms of mystification,
not to be taken at face value, but to be exposed in order to reveal
the larger adverse effects on the believers themselves. To be brutally concrete, the factory worker who buys into the dream of one
day being a capitalist, the Catholic observant who embraces the
imperative of turning the other cheek, the sister-in-law who represses her delight at the death of her sister out of revolt at the
attraction she feels for her brother-in-law, in each of these cases
the individuals' beliefs are shown to be not only disconnected
from their explicit justification but against their better interests
in the sense of being deeply detrimental to the well-being of the
individuals. 26
In this sense, the different strands of radical thought seek to
lift a veil from our eyes in order to emancipate us from domination, cowardice, or repression. They unmask in order to liberate.
They are quintessential exemplars of "critical theory": they represent, as Raymond Geuss sets forth in The Idea of a Critical

19 See generally Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in
Lenin andPhilosophyand OtherEssays (Monthly Review Press 1971).
20 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au College de France,19781979 22 (Paris, Gallimard 2004).
21 See generally Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia (Penguin 2009) (Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, trans).
22 See generally Jacques Lacan, Erits: The First Complete Edition in English (Norton 2006) (Bruce Fink, trans).
23 See generally Julia Kristeva, Powers ofHorror:An Essay on Abjection (Columbia
1982).
24 See generally Renata Salecl, The Spoils ofFreedom:Psychoanalysisand Feminism
afterthe FallofSocialism (Routledge 1994).
25 See generally Slavoj 2izek, The Sublime Object ofIdeology(Verso 1989).
26 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology 67 et seq (Prometheus
1998); Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals, First Essay, Sections 7-10, 3339 (Vintage Books 1989); Sigmund Freud, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Second
Lecture, 24-25 (Norton 1977).
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Theory2 7 first, a form of knowledge that, second, produces enlightenment and emancipation, in a manner, third, that is reflective as opposed to objectifying. Or, to use Geuss's own words,
they each represent "a reflective theory which gives agents a
kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and
emancipation."28 The radical interventions spawned by Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud do just that: they serve to displace received
meanings and reveal deeper forces at play (whether political,
economic, or related to will to power or to psychological desires)
that undermine apparent interests and free subjects from various forms of oppression.
III.
In order to better grasp these family resemblances, let me offer illustrations from several critical interventions in the field of
punishment and political economy-the field in which I toil. The
first intervention traces to Marx through the Frankfurt School.
In 1939, Max Horkheimer published Georg Rusche and Otto
Kirchheimer's Punislment and Social Structure,29 a work that
unearthed, beneath the more conventional set of beliefs about
the sovereign's legitimate right to punish and the centuries-old
debate over the rationales for punishment-deterrence, retribution, correction, etc.-a deeper political economy of punishment.
Rusche and Kirchheimer documented, for instance, how the ministers of Louis XIV demanded that magistrates sentence convicts
to the galleys, not because of the heinousness of their crimes, nor
to deter them, but because the King needed more oarsmen for his
ships-citing this chilling letter dated February 21, 1676, directed to the public prosecutors of the Parlementde Paris.
[S]ince His Majesty urgently needs more men to strengthen His rowing crews ....

to be delivered at the end of the

following month, His Majesty commands me to tell you
that He wishes you to take the necessary steps in His
name in order to have the criminals judged quickly. 30
27 Geuss, The Idea of a CriticalTheory (cited in note 11). Geuss explicitly developed
the idea of a critical theory in relation to the Frankfurt School and added in the margin
that it would apply equally well to Freud, and bears important family resemblances with
Nietzsche. Id at 1 and 43-44.
28 Id at 2.

29 See generally Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (Transaction 2003).
.0

Id at 55.
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Rusche and Kirchheimer revealed how those same ministers
directed magistrates to not commute sentences of death to galley
labor when the convict was over fifty-five or infirm and missing
an arm or leg, given that invalids were of no use on the King's
ships. 31 They demonstrated how, in later periods, to increase
productivity, convict labor at the H6pitaux Generaux in Paris
would be incentivized to work harder by giving them a share of
the profits, or how, still later, prison labor conditions of solitary
confinement would be gradually abandoned as the free labor
supply became more abundant. 32
Rusche and Kirchheimer revealed that our conventional
ways of justifying punishment-the discourse of deterrence or
correction-were in fact veils that hid the true political economy
of punishment, an economy driven by the need for labor and
shaped by modes of production and social relations. People may
well have believed, at the time, that galley or solitary confinement was the justified or proportional punishment for wrongdoing because it was appropriately harsh or cured the soul, but in
fact the "wrongdoing" itself may simply have been an excuse to
get able-bodied men to grow an empire at little cost to the sovereign. In a similar way today, we might be tempted to explore how
the mass incarceration of young black men in a post-industrial
age where real unemployment hovers around twenty percent relates to the high rates of unemployment in the inner city 3 3 and to
the political needs of adjacent counties whose economies depend
entirely on guard labor and prison-related industries. 34
A second illustration traces to Nietzsche, who described in
The Genealogy of Morals how our ideas about the "purposes" of
punishment serve only to mask the relations of power that have
imposed meaning on punishment practices, and how we fool ourselves constantly into believing that we punish people in order to
improve, to deter, or to restitute, etc. "Today it is impossible to
31 "His Majesty has instructed me to inform you that in the cases of prisoners who
are over fifty-five years of age or who have lost an arm or a leg or are disabled or incurably sick, His Majesty does not wish His judges to invoke this order in order to exempt
prisoners from sentences which they really merit [that is, death]." Id at 57 (Letter dated
September 11, 1677).
32 Id at 45, 102-11, 128-29. See also Hoy, Power, Repression, Progressat 130-132
(cited in note 8).
3 Steve Clemons, Real Unemployment Shows US Economy Short 20 Million Jobs,
online at http/www.huffingtonpost.conVsteve-clemongreal-unemployment-shows-u b_
843783.html (visited Sept 6, 2011).
34 Brian Mann, N Y Gov. Threatens to Mothball More Prisons, online at
http/www.npr.org/2011/01/27/133276372/new-york-gov-threatens-to-mothball-moreprisons (visited Sept 6, 2011).
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say for certain why people are really punished," Nietzsche declared; "purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power
has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon
it the character of a function."35 The discourse of "just punishment" is a veneer that distracts attention from what really determines punitive practices.
More than a hundred years later, Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish would draw on Nietzsche's genealogical approach (as well as the political economic approach of Rusche and
Kirchheimer) 36 to expose, beneath the modern progress narrative
of increasingly enlightened punishments, disciplinary forms of
punishment that more effectively render the human body docile. 3 7 The modern progress narrative-reflected so vividly in Emile Durkheim's discovery of "the two laws of penal evolution" that
purportedly push civilization toward greater leniency 38-was
precisely a type of signification imposed on our punitive practices
as a result of complex relations of power in society including, importantly, systems of knowledge that privileged the psy professions. 39 By tracing the birth of the disciplinary techniques of the
strict control of time and space, the ranking of individuals and
activities, the forced repetition of exercises, the examination and
accompanying comparisons, measures, hierarchies, and classifications, and the internalization of control through panoptic
mechanisms of surveillance, Discipline and Punish revealed how
these disciplinary forms replaced brutal corporal punishments as
more effective means of shaping modern men and womengiving way to a political economy of the body. 40 The rehabilitative
prison project of the mid-twentieth century, it turns out, had less
to do with the debate over the "right to punish" than with the
production of docile students, workers, soldiers, mothers, and
citizens. The birth of the idea of the "delinquent" and the "criminal"-the modern human subject whose soul needs to be
3 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, Section 13 at 80 (cited in
note 26) (emphasis in original) (The passage continues, "all concepts in which an entire
process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is
definable.").
36 See Michel Foucault, Surveilleret punir:Naissancede la prison 29-30 (Gallimard
1975).
3 Id (developing the idea of a political economy of the body).
3 See generally Emile Durkheim, Deux lois de levolution penale, in LAnnee Sociologique 1899-1900 (Presses Universitaires de France 1901), translated and included in
Chapter 4 of Steven Lukes and Andrew Scull, Durkheim and the Law(St Martin's 1983).
3 See Foucault, Surveiller et punir at 137-229 (cited in note 36); see also Nikolas
Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood(Cambridge 1998).
40 See generally Foucault, Surveiller et punir(cited in note 36).
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straightened out in an orthopedic way-reflects larger shifts in
relations of power in society, including new professions and systems of knowledge, rather than a valid "reason" for our belief in
the necessity of the prison.
A third illustration traces to Freud, who proposed, in Civilization and Its Discontents, that punishment is best understood
as a collective act of repression that serves to reinforce feelings of
guilt in order to control our desires and to tame human subjects.
The sense of guilt, born of the tension between desire and restraint, Freud wrote, "expresses itself as a need for punishment.
Civilization, therefore," Freud continued, "obtains mastery over
the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening
and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to
watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city."41 Recall that
the front piece of Civilization and Its Discontents represented
"The Prisoner's Dream"-the docile image of a dreaming prisoner
whose passions had been tamed. For Freud, beneath the surface,
beneath the dominant talk of wrongdoing and culpability, desires
and drives to life, death, pleasure, and destruction shaped our
punitive practices.
Contemporary theorists, such as Jack Katz in The Seduc-

tions of Crime and Donald Black in Crime as Social Control,
draw on these Freudian insights to explore the deeper psychological attractions to deviant behavior: the sexual thrill of shoplifting, the self-righteous indignation of domestic murder, the hard
manliness of the stick-up. 42 William Connolly, in The Desire to
Punish, draws on similar insights (as well as on the writings of
Nietzsche and Foucault) to expose the vengeful desire that permeates our contemporary punitive excess-"desire," by which
Connolly intends to capture "something closer to an organization
of energy, beyond [simple] needs, to possess, caress, love, emulate, help, befriend, defeat, stymie, boss, fuck, kill, or injure other
human beings, both as individuals and as types." 43 These subliminal drives, Connolly maintains, do far more to shape contemporary punishment techniques than all the explicit reasons that
the magistrates and prosecutors articulate at sentencing. 44
41 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 70-71 (Norton 1961) (James
Strachey, trans).
42 See generally Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in
DoingEvil (Basic Books 1988); Donald Black, Crime as Social Control,48 American Sociological Review 34, 34-45 (1983).
43 William Connolly, The Desire to Punish, in The Ethos of Pluralization41, 49 (Minnesota 1995).
44 Id at 65.

29]1

RADICAL THOUGHT

39

Notice the strong family resemblances between these different traditions of radical thought (even as they undergo important
shifts throughout the twentieth century). Notice the shared idea
that our dominant ways of talking about "just punishment"
somehow mask the true forces at play-or, to put it in another
way, that our beliefs about just punishment (no matter how
strongly we believe them to be true) are an illusion produced in
unanticipated ways by forces that are unrelated to the reasons
we give (for instance, by labor supply, modes of production, and
capital accumulation; will to power, relations of force, and systems of knowledge; or unconscious drives, repression, and desires). The explicit reasons on which we ground our judgments
about punitive practices (such as, for instance, that the death
penalty is or is not a deterrent to homicide, that rehabilitation
does or does not work, that individuals are or are not responsible
for their behavior, or that poverty and difficult social conditions
do or do not "cause" crime) are not really, in the end, the driving
force behind those punitive practices.

IV.
At this first stage, then, there seem to be far too many family resemblances to view the relationship through the lens, essentially, of mutual exclusion, of an "either-or" decision-to suggest
that what Lukes refers to as the "regimes of truth" critique
would pose an objection or make us reject a Frankfurt School
approach. To the contrary, it would seem that critical theorists
could borrow from various strands of each tradition to enrich
their analyses. So, for instance, in the area of punishment and
modern society, a critical theorist could draw inspiration from
these different variations of radical thought to discern a role for
the structural transformation of economic relations or perhaps
for a political economy of the body, to give room to relations of
power and resistance, to find a place for human desire, all the
while trying to articulate interpretations that push the critical
intervention even further.
The different strands of radical thought push in a similar direction: they make us ask how it is, exactly, that people begin to
believe things that may ultimately undermine their own interests, how they come to embrace desires and beliefs that may be
detrimental to them, and how they participate actively in that
process. It is important to remember that both Marx, in his discussion of the fetishism of commodities, and later Lukacs in his
discussion of false consciousness, were precisely concerned with
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giving an account of how the reproduction of capitalist social relations gave rise to a false belief. More specifically, to the false
belief that certain socially generated attributes of things and
patterns of behavior (for Marx, for example, the attribute of exchange value, which constitutes the commodity form) are "naturally given," that is, given independently of the reproduction of
the very social relations. Marx and Lukacs were deeply concerned with giving an account of how those beliefs were born and
came to be seen as true.
Their endeavor is a close cousin to Foucault's study of
veridiction, of how beliefs come to be perceived as true-to what
Lukes refers to as the "regimes of truth" critique. The relationship, naturally, is complex, and Foucault himself, in a number of
significant passages, addressed the intricate overlap and important distinctions between the notion of ideology and his work
on truth and vdridiction.45 Foucault maintained that the idea of
falsity (what he referred to as "error" or "illusion") was misleading because the beliefs held are "a set of practices and real practices that establish them and mark them imperiously in the domain of the real";4 6 in other passages, Foucault historically contextualized the Frankfurt School writings and suggested that the
shifting political situation in France might bring them in closer
intellectual proximity to his critical enterprise.4 7
Without doubt, though, there remain significant differences
among the truth claims that these social theorists asserted. The
Marxist tradition, as we all know, is informed by a historical
narrative and theory of class conflict that infuses the concept of
ideology with a far more robust notion of truth or falsity. 48 This is
reflected well, for instance, in Max Horkheimer's claim that:
"The facts of science and science itself are but segments of the
life process of society, and in order to understand the significance
of facts or of science generally one must possess the key to the
historical situation, the right social theory"49 By the "right" so' In his 1976 lectures, Society Must be Defended, for instance, Foucault specifically
explained how his work on power/knowledge intersected but differed from the Marxist
idea of ideology. See Michel Foucault, I faut defender Ja socidt& Cours au College de
France,1975-1976 30 (Gallimard 1997). See also Foucault, Naissancede la biopolitique
at 21-22 (cited in note 20); Foucault, Qu'est-ce que la critique?at 42-46 (cited in note 8).
46 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitiqueat 22 (cited in note 20).
47 Foucault, Qu est-ce que la critique?at43-44 (cited in note 8).
48 While this is undoubtedly true of the Marxist tradition and of the reading that
Steven Lukes proposes in defense of false consciousness, there are other readings of Marx
that differ on this point.
49 Max Horkheimer, The Latest Attack on Metaphysics, in Max Horkheimer, Critical
Theory: Selected Essays 132-187, 159 (Continuum 2002) (emphasis added).
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cial theory, Horkheimer had in mind a proper understanding of
oppression and conflict in society: only when the social theorist
was able to distinguish distorted impressions would she be able
to properly understand the world and conduct social research.
Similarly, the Freudian strand, at least at its origin, contained a robust notion of defect, of psychosis, of an end state, or
state of being, that evidently worked against one's best interest.
And Nietzsche's writings incorporated a notion of will to power
that often referenced victors and losers, thereby signaling what
he believed to be true and false, or at least normatively valuable.
The "slave revolt in morality," the revolt that inverted aristocratic values, Nietzsche lamented, "we no longer see because it has
been victorious."5 0 Nietzsche explicitly wrote that values had
been flipped on their head: "the wretched alone are the good; the
poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived,
sick, ugly alone are pious ...

and you, the powerful and noble,

are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable,
the godless to all eternity. . . ."51 We knew where Nietzsche stood.
We knew what he believed to be morally superior.
By contrast, in certain contemporary radical strands, the objective truth of what people come to believe plays less central
stage, but that in no way detracts from our ability to explore the
consequences of those belief systems. In Foucault's writings, for
instance, it is clear by the end of Discipline and Punish that the
Enlightenment story is not entirely accurate (despite the fact
that practically everyone believes it still today) given that the
disciplinary techniques serve a similar function, only more effectively, of rendering human subjects docile. 52 Many readers will
doubt that modern society has become more lenient, and see instead how it has become better at punishing-or, as Foucault
provocatively wrote, how it learned "not to punish less, but to
punish better; to punish with a severity perhaps attenuated, but
to punish with greater universality and necessity; to insert the
power to punish more deeply into the social body." 53 There may
be no claim of error, but nevertheless the implications are clear.
The consequences of the belief system are apparent. They are
visible. Once again, there is nothing in the text or argument that
claims that this is "a correct view that is not itself imposed by
5

Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals, First Essay, Section 7 at 34 (cited in note

26).
51 Id.

52 See generally Foucault, Surveiller et punir(cited in note 36).
53 Id at 84.
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power."54 As Foucault remarked in the English preface to The
Order of hings, "[i]t would hardly behove me, of all people, to
claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of
which I am very largely unaware. . . ."55 Nor is there anything in
the text or argument that makes an explicit normative evaluation of how, for instance, disciplinary practices compare to brutal
corporal punishment. Yet we can explore at what price people
came to believe the progress narrative of history.
There are, indeed, significant differences in the quality of
the truth claims. Steven Lukes, in his defense of the idea of false
consciousness, emphasizes that there is "truth to be attained," a
more purified form of truth, a "correct view that is not itself imposed by power."5 6 By contrast, Lukes maintains that on Foucault's view, there can be no normative judgment because it is
power all the way down. Lukes writes that for Foucault, "there
can be no liberation from power, either within a given context or
across contexts; and there is no way of judging between ways of
life, since each imposes its own 'regime of truth'. . . ."51 For Foucault, apparently, it is turtles all the way down. But that charge,
I take it, is neither very constructive, nor entirely accurate: Foucault's genealogies denaturalize in a manner that allows the
reader to see, quite well, the consequences of belief systems.
Showing how the idea of the delinquent or of the criminal is born
and emerges-how this truth is produced-denaturalizes the
turn to actuarial criminology and the theory of social defense. It
creates the condition of possibility for critique. It makes possible
our own critical interventions.
V.
Rather than rehash the problem of infinite regress, it is
more productive for social theory to see how the subtle differences within these family resemblances push us to ask slightly
different sets of questions. In Steven Lukes's essay, for instance,
the focus on the question of "falsity" has effects: it centers the
inquiry on identifying false reasons and reasoning, on revealing
the incompatibility of beliefs with true interests, in order ulti-

54 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 19 (cited in note 2).
55 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things xiv (Pantheon Books 1970).
56 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 28 (last paragraph) and 19 (first paragraph) (cited in
note 2).
57 Lukes, Powerat 91-92 (cited in note 1), citing Foucault, Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 38 (Vintage 1980).
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mately to identify what the true interests of the ordinary citizen
are and how they are best promoted. By contrast, focusing on the
production of truth may have a different emphasis and pose a
slightly different set of questions: how it is, exactly, that people
come to believe what they believe, how belief systems relate to
shifting relations of power, how certitude is born and evolves,
how subjects participate in the very processes that turn them
into subjects, how beliefs naturalize and hide from view problematic practices, what are the distributional consequences with
regard to resources, social status, stigma, relations of power, etc.
The shift in focus, I would argue, is productive for contemporary critical theory. This is especially so because the truth of ideologies, beliefs, or knowledge-however one wishes to describe
the cognitive set of beliefs held by persons-is actually far more
complex than the simple notion of "falsity" would seem to convey.
Let me explain by using the helpful illustration that Steven
Lukes discusses: the case of the repeal of the estate tax.58
As Lukes and others have shown, the repeal of the estate tax
benefitted only a very small fraction of Americans, approximately two percent of the wealthiest taxpayers. Yet there was a
groundswell of support for repeal, especially among those on the
right. The best evidence, as Lukes recounts, suggests three possible explanations for this puzzle: optimism bias, factual ignorance, or symbolism. The first, optimism bias, is the exaggerated
or unrealistic hope of enrichment. The second is the inaccurate
belief that a majority of Americans pay estate tax. The third is
the negative associations that emerged with what became known
as the "death tax."
In his essay, Lukes characterizes ordinary, middle-class citizens who favored the repeal of the estate tax as suffering from
false consciousness. It is precisely with regard to these citizens
that Lukes writes, "[they] are mistaken about what their interests are, what harms them, what would best serve them, and
who can be trusted to look after them."59 Moreover, it is precisely
here that Lukes rebuts the 'regimes of truth' objection: "[They]
hold factual beliefs that are susceptible of truth and falsity (thus
meeting the [regimes of truth] objection) [and s]ome of these key
beliefs can be shown to be false."60
58 The example is also discussed in Leiter, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion at 86-87
(cited in note 11), with a useful reference to Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut Con, NY Times
Magazine 54, 59 (Sept 14, 2003).
5 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 26 (cited in note 2).
60 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 26-27 (cited in note 2).
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The difficulty is that the specific reasons these citizens may
have articulated for supporting repeal (for instance, the fact that
a majority of Americans are burdened by this estate tax) can easily be shown to be false, but this does not necessarily undermine
their largerbelief system (for instance, the belief in more limited
government). To put it another way, there are different kinds of
truth at play, and these important differences are elided by using
the single or simple concept of "falsity." In the same way that lan
Hacking discerns different "kinds of making up people," there are
here different kinds of truths that we need to pull apart. 61
One truth claim involves the factual question of what ordinary Americans believed regarding how many of their fellow citizens paid estate taxes. For present purposes, let us assume, with
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro, that a majority of Americans
believed that the majority of their fellow citizens would have had
to pay an estate tax. 62 This first truth claim is subject to easy
empirical counter-demonstration: it would have been easy in the
1990s to take a poll of what Americans believed and to compare
that to a reliable assessment of the number of Americans who
did in fact pay estate tax. And we could thus empirically demonstrate that the majority of ordinary Americans were "factually
wrong" about how many Americans paid estate tax.
But the truth of that claim differs markedly from the truth
of the belief that repealing the estate tax would benefit them.
This second truth claim rests on a larger set of beliefs about liberty and governance-namely, that smaller government is going
to be better for Americans, that individual responsibility and a
limited state is better for everyone in the long run. This latter
claim is not subject to the same type of empirical falsification as
the first.
To put this perhaps more precisely, the political belief in the
advantages of limited government has different truth value than
the assertion that a majority of Americans pay estate tax. It is
relatively easy to demonstrate that the latter assertion is false
and that its opposite is true: a tiny fraction of Americans paid
estate tax. The latter assertion calls for a binary "true or false"
judgment. But the former claim is not of that type. It is not possible to say, "the belief in limited government is false and its opposite, the belief in a welfare state, is true." To be sure, some
61 Ian Hacking, Making up People, in Historical Ontology 99-114, 113 (Harvard
2002).
62 Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over
Taxing Inbeited Wealth 118 (Princeton 2005).
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people might disagree and argue that the welfare state actually
does, truly, promote the interests of the ordinary American better; but here, I would have to disagree.63
Faith in big government is just as manufactured as faith in
limited government. In this regard, Lukes generously points to
the argument in The Illusion of Free Markets. 64 There, I argue
precisely that the idea of small versus large government is itself
an illusion. There is regulation in both "deregulated" and "hyperregulated" contexts; the government, in effect, is always present.
It may be more visible when it nationalizes Bank of America or
Citibank, as it did in 2008; but it was equally present and regulating before that as well-and after. We tend to think of the
Chicago Board of Trade as a quasi-private self-regulatory institution, but as I show in The Illusion of Free Markets, it is regulated through-and-through and owes its very existence to pervasive
state intervention in, among other things, forcibly closing competing bucket-shops and regulating everything from corners to
modified-closing calls. 65 We delude ourselves when we characterize different economic forms of organization as "more" or "less"
regulated, "more" or "less" free. The notion of freedom is orthogonal to the organization of economic exchange and markets.
In this sense, the idea of limited government in the economic
sphere-as opposed to the political sphere-is no more than a
story we tell ourselves. It could possibly even be characterized,
loosely, as "false," but not because the opposite is "true." Rather,
both the category of "limited" and that of "overregulated" states
are tropes that have had significant consequences for American
politics and punitive policies. The key questions to ask are how
such ideas are born, how they become natural, how they come to
be seen as true, and with what consequences.6 6 In the process, it
starts to become clear how someone who believes in the ideal of
limited government might also be predisposed to believe that the
estate tax affects more Americans. In other words, we begin to
63 I should note here that I am not entirely sure from his essay whether Lukes would
agree or disagree with me on this specific point. His generous discussion of The Illusion of
Free Markets does not resolve whether he believes that (a) the belief in limited government is an illusion and that the welfare state promotes people's real interests, or (b) all
economic spaces are essentially regulated and that it makes no sense to even speak of a
welfare state. Lukes's reference to a "truth to be attained" militates in favor of the first
reading (a), but the discussion of the illusion of deregulation would tend to support the
second reading (b).
64 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of
NaturalOrder(Harvard 2011).
65 Id.

66 Id at 49-50.
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see how even factual errors can be a product of certain belief systems-or how facts can be selectively interpreted.6 7 The power of
truth, I take it, is that it can lead individuals to interpret known
facts-and guess at unknown facts-in systematically distorted
ways. Falsely-held facts may at times be less a proof of false consciousness, than the product of a set of beliefs.
VI.
The shift in emphasis away from "falsity" is productive for
critical theory for other reasons as well. In particular, it facilitates implicating the subject-implicating ourselves-in the production of truth. I should emphasize, of course, that all three
strands of radical thought focus attention on the subject and the
question of subjectivity-on the way in which individuals implicate themselves in their own subjection and at times defeat their
own self-interests, whether by embracing a particular set of ideological beliefs, by experiencing a form of ressentimentthat turns
against the nobler instincts, or by repressing drives and desires.
In his essay as well, Steven Lukes underscores the subjective
dimension at several points, observing for instance that "we can
be fully engaged in bamboozling ourselves."6 8 Nevertheless, this
subjective dimension is an element of critique that more comfortably blossoms when we move away from accusations of "falsity."
Foucault's explorations of subjectivity-a theme which traversed his entire corpus of writings and lectures-is an excellent
place to begin.69 In a series of lectures delivered at Louvain-laNeuve in Belgium in 1981, titled Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonction de
l'aveu en justice ["Wrong-doing, Truth-telling: The Function of
Avowal in Justice"], Foucault focused our attention on how the
subject, through the avowal, participates in his own subjectivation and governance. 70 As my colleague and coeditor, Fabienne
67 In this regard, Dan Kahan and his colleagues in the Cultural Cognition Project at
Yale University are conducting interesting ongoing research. See, for example, Dan M.
Kahan, et al, Who Fears the IJPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental
Study of the Mechanisms of CulturalCognition, 34 Law and Human Behavior 501, 50116 (2010).
68 Lukes, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 22 (cited in note 2); see also id at 24 ("[T]he third
answer allows that they, in turn, can be subject to the power of others and of themselves.").
69 Foucault's emphasis on the subject and subjectivity is evident from his earliest
work, as is clear from a reading of his supplemental doctoral project, his Introduction to
Kant's Anthropology (MIT 2008).
70 See generally Michel Foucault, Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonction de 1'aveu en justice
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Brion, and I articulate in our preface to his Louvain lectures,
Foucault developed there the third piece to his critical apparatus: beyond power and knowledge, he focused our attention on
the subject-something which, he maintained, was essential to
properly engage in critique. Several years later, in Le Couragede
la vdrite, Foucault would make the point even more clearly, emphasizing that it is a "pure and simple caricature" to present the
knowledge/power critique (or what has been referred to earlier as
"the regimes of truth critique") through an account "in which the
subject does not have a role."n
In our preface to Mal faire, dire vrai, Brion and I underscore
the importance of the subject's implication in his own subjectivation through Foucault's discussion of the Homeric chapter on Antilochus and Menelaus, the famous episode of the chariot race.
Through the Homeric episode, a certain social hierarchy-one in
which gods take precedence over humans, and senior heroic figures over the younger-is reproduced through Antilochus's own
act of deferring to Menelaus, whom he admits is older and wiser
than he. What Foucault emphasizes in the episode is that the
order of truth, the specific social hierarchy, is not simply imposed
on Antilochus by means of a traditional conception of powernamely, by someone "more" powerful imposing a regime of truth
on another who would be "subject" to that power. Nor is it merely
maintained or produced through knowledge; it is no mere product of a savoir.Rather, Antilochus implicates himself in the production of the social order through a quasi-avowal that functions
to establish that very social order in a new way--one, in fact,
that may extend even greater legitimacy to the social order. For
had Menelaus imposed his victory over Antilochus by means of a
jury composed of more senior heroic figures, the victory itself
would not have been received in the same way. By offering Antilochus the opportunity to take an oath, Menelaus allows Antilochus to blame his own youth and exuberance and, in effect, to
embrace and restore an order of truth that governs him and subjects him in relation to Menelaus.
In the same way, contemporary subjects are deeply implicated in the orders of truth in which they are inscribed and inscribe
themselves. The Illusion of Free Markets offers a helpful illus(Presses Universitaires de Louvain (French), University of Chicago (English) forthcoming
2011) (Fabienne Brion and Bernard Harcourt, eds).
71 Michel Foucault, Le Courage de la verite: Cours au College de France, 1984 10
(SeuiVGallimard 2009) ("[L]a presentation de pareilles recherches .. . dans des structures
out le sujet n'a pas de place, ne peut etre qu'une pure et simple caricature.").

48

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

tration again. One potential criticism of the thesis of the bookespecially in Europe where a more robust acceptance of the welfare state still (precariously) survives-is that the real culprits
responsible for mass incarceration are neoconservative law-andorder policies involving "three-strikes," mandatory minimums,
preventative detention, harsh sentencing guidelines, and the
War on Drugs. Why then focus on neoliberalism?
The answer turns on the question of subjectivity. It is far too
easy to point fingers at neoconservative policies and thereby absolve everyone else. The critical intervention in The Illusion of
Free Markets is to explore precisely how it is that we allowed
hyperincarceration to happen. One important aspect, I contend,
is the widely shared belief-shared, that is, by a vast majority of
the American people 72-in the incompetence of government in
economic regulation, coupled with the belief in the legitimacy of
government when it comes to policing and punishing. This mindset has facilitated the growth of the penal sphere.
The idea of natural order in economics emerged in the eighteenth century hand-in-hand with an ideal of punishment despotism, or in other words with the idea that the quasi-exclusive
competence of the state was in the area of security.7 3 It is this
paradoxical juxtaposition that has facilitated the growth of the
penal sphere-not just during the period of neoliberalism during
the past forty years, but also at the beginning of the nineteenth
century with the birth of the penitentiary. Periods of strong belief in free market ideals have gone together with the birth and
expansion of the carceral domain. 74 It is important not to lose
sight of our own implication in these outcomes-and to do so may
require a lighter touch on the accusation of "falsity."
VII.
This brings us back to Steven Lukes's essay-more specifically, to the issue of whether one strand of radical thought could
possibly present an obstacle to another. If, as I have argued, the
family resemblances are indeed such that the different radical
strands build on each other on the first go-round, could it be that,
in later iterations, Lukes's conviction that we can "attain a truth"
that is "not itself imposed by power" might hinder further critical
72 The polling data support this empirical claim. See Harcourt, The Illusion of Free
Markets at 11-12 (cited in note 64).
73 Id at 92-102.
74 Id at 208-20.
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interventions? Could it possibly be that Lukes's emphasis on
hard notions of truth and falsity presents an obstacle to critical
theory the next time that we need it?
I suspect that the answer is yes. As I have explored elsewhere, it often happens that useful categories-perhaps I could
even say useful and truthful categories, categories that serve to
reveal illusions at one point in time-get in the way of addressing new problems at later points. The notion of discipline, for
instance, may have been extremely useful at a certain historical
moment to question the progress narrative of punishment and to
destabilize a certain modern self-righteous complacency; but once
that task has been accomplished, the idea itself may become a
hindrance to further critical interventions in the larger effort to
destabilize punishment per se.7 5 In a similar vein, the category of
repression-or,for that matter, of the repressive hypothesismay serve a useful purpose in one historical context, but later
may begin to mask troubling forms of governance. The notion of
"beheading the king" may be a productive political intervention
in the study of power at one time, but may stymie critical
thought at a later date.
To return one final time to The Illusion of Free Markets: in
his lectures in 1978 at the College de France on Securite, territoire, population, Foucault used the Parisian policing of grain
markets as a leading illustration of the concept of discipline in
order to help identify another form of governance-what he
called securit--and to destabilize the notion of liberty at the
heart of liberalism. 7 6 Foucault went so far, in fact, as to create
the neologism of the "police disciplinairedes grains"-inscribing
discipline into the practices of the period.7 7 What I suggest in the
book is that, at a later time, that useful category of disciplinecan
turn into a hindrance that solidifies the differences between
75 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Supposons que la discipline et la securite n'existent pas
- RereadingFoucault's College de FranceLectures (with Paul Veyne) in CarceralNotebooks - Vol 4 (2008) (Harcourt, ed) (where I argue that the categories of discipline and
securite may shield us from having to ask harder questions about the need for punishment); Harcourt, The Illusion ofFree Markets at 47-48 (cited in note 64) (where I suggest
that the category of disciplinemay reify, rather than undermine, the notion of free markets).
76 In Securit, territoire,population, Foucault uses the police des grains as an example of disciplinary mechanisms in contrast to the security approach of the Physiocrats.
Sdcuritd, territoire, population: Cours au CollAge de Fance 1977-1978, 46-47
(SeuiVGallimard 2004). Foucault refers to these forms of policing as being "in the world of
discipline." Id at 348. See also id at 351, 354-55, 361. Foucault offers the same reading in
his recap of those lectures at the beginning of his next annual lectures, Naissance de la
biopolitique at 9 (cited in note 20).
7 Foucault, Sdcuritd, territoire, populationat 46 (cited in note 76).
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"free" markets and "overly-regulated" markets in the current
American neoliberal context, in such a way as to mask an illusion-that there could even be such a thing as an unregulated
space. It also hides the fact that much of the policing of grain
markets in eighteenth-century Paris was trivial, to say the
least.78 In effect, it reifies the discipline of the "over-regulated"
space.
In this sense, it is equally important to resist truth. A genuinely nominalist approach demands the recurrent abandonment
of the very categories that identify illusions and emancipate at
earlier times. By this, I certainly do not mean to embrace a kind
of relativism that I sense, from the essay, troubles Steven Lukes
most. Rather, I mean to suggest that the critical path does not
rest on truer knowledge-a deeper kind of truth to attain-but
on constantly destabilizing what we come to believe. Knowledge,
I would suggest with Foucault, is "murderous."79 It is only when
we know who the accused really is, that we can sentence him to
death. It is only when we know how to rehabilitate, that we institutionalize people en masse in asylums and mental hospitals. It
is only when we know that incapacitation works, that we systematize mass incarceration. In the field of crime and punishment, the moments of punitive excess are inextricably linked
with moments of certitude. The critical task ahead is not simply
to reveal "falsity" or even illusions in order to establish the
"truth," but to constantly challenge the crystallization and solidification of our own truth telling.
VIII.
Steven Lukes traces the notion of false consciousness to
Etienne de la Bo6tie's tract, De la servitude volontaire.80 As Fabienne Brion and I underscore in our preface to Foucault's Louvain lectures, it is important to recall that Foucault himself de78 Harcourt, The Illusion ofFree Markets at 153-171 (cited in note 64).

7 Foucault made this precise point in his essay in 1971 titled Nietzsche, la genealogie, ihistoire,where he wrote:
L'analyse historique de ce grand vouloir-savoir qui parcourt i'humanit6 fait
donc apparaitre A la fois qu'il n'y a pas de connaissance qui ne repose sur
l'injustice (qu'il n'y a donc pas, dans la connaissance meme, un droit a la verite
ou un fondement du vrai) et que l'instinct de connaissance est mauvais (qu'il y a
en lui quelque chose de meurtrier, et qu'il ne peut, qu'il ne veut rien pour le
bonheur des hommes).
Dits et dcrits,vol 2 #84 at 155 (vol 1 at 1023 in 2001 ed) (cited in note 7).
so Etienne de la Boetie, De la servitude volontaire 33 et seq (Droz 1987).
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fined the critical impulse by inverting the very title of de la
Bo6tie's short book. What Foucault called for was "inservitude
volontaire"-in English, "voluntary inservitude" (using the negative or privative force of the Latin prefix in) or "voluntary unservitude" (using the negative force of the Old English prefix un).8 1
By this, Foucault had in mind the idea of resistance to being governed-or, more precisely, to being governed in this or that
Way.82

I would go further and call for resistance, not simply to this
or that way of being governed, but resistance to truth. Not in the
sense, again, that truth is merely socially constructed-not the
sense in which Lukes criticizes the "regimes of truth" critique.
But, rather, in the sense that all of our own useful categoriestruthful categories that help pierce illusions-themselves need to
be constantly re-examined, requestioned, and ultimately abandoned. New categories of thought that expose misleading forms
of rationalization, that unveil entrenched and debilitating categories of thought, are only useful at a moment in time, and become a hindrance when they too become crystallized or entrenched.
The task, as I see it, is to unmask and enlighten, but then to
shed the tools we have used, before those very beliefs become
oppressive themselves. As a historical matter, I suspect, our
twentieth-century experience with certain forms of communism
confirms this instinct. 83 At a theoretical level, I believe, resisting
truth is intimately related to the crucial nominalist dimension of
critical theory. 84 In the end, knowledge may indeed allow us to
master relations of power; but mastery itself may be a dangerous
thing.

81 Foucault, Qu'est-ce que la critique?at 39 (cited in note 8).
82 Id at 38.

83 This is the central problem with calling the emancipatory impulse that has animated political revolutions since the French Revolution the "communist hypothesis," as
Alain Badiou does in Lhypothese communiste (Nouvelles Editions Lignes 2009).
84 See Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets at 44-45 (cited in note 64).

